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Informed Consent Civil Actions for Post-Abortion
Psychological Trauma
Thomas R. Eller*
The purpose of this Article is to explore under what circumstances a
woman who has sustained psychological damage from an abortion may
maintain a cause of action against the abortion provider for failing to have
properly informed her before the procedure of the risk of adverse psycho-
logical consequences which could be caused or aggravated by the abortion.
These consequences can be serious and destructive. Every year in the
United States approximately one and one-half million legal abortions are
performed.' According to some authorities, ten to fifteen percent of wo-
men who have had an abortion are subject to long-term depression or emo-
tional distress caused by the procedure;2 other studies have found that
fewer than ten percent of women who have had a legal abortion during
their first trimester develop long-term psychiatric or emotional reactions.3
In addition to depression, reactions after abortion include repression,4 a
sense of loss, 5 guilt,6 sleeping disorders, 7 anniversary reactions, 8 disturbed
* Partner, Eller, Brink & Sextro, Denison, Iowa, A.B. Carleton College 1964,J.D. University
of Iowa College of Law 1967.
1 Paul K.B. Dagg, The Psychological Sequelae of Therapeutic Abortion-Denied and Completed, 148
AM.J. PsYcHATRY 578 (1991);Jo Ann Rosenfeld, Emotional Responses to Therapeutic Abortion, 45 Am.
FAm. PHYSICIAN 137 (1992).
2 HARoLD I. KAPLAN& & BENJAMINJ. SADocK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1701
(6th ed. 1995). Dagg, supra note 1, at 579-83, contains a summary of studies on depression. He
emphasizes that the great majority of women appear not to suffer long-term depression or ad-
verse psychological impact from abortion. Short-term depression or stress, however, appears to
be common. See also Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological Responses After Abortion, 248 Sci. 41 (1990),
which concludes from a study of medical literature that abortion most often does not lead to later
psychological problems.
3 Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 137.
4 Dagg, supra note 1, at 582; Linda L. Layne, Motherhood Lost: Cultural Dimensions of Miscar-
riage and Still Birth in America, 16 WOMEN & HEALTH 69 (1990), noting that in American culture,
pregnancy loss is a subject not easily discussed.
5 Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 138.
6 Id. at 139. Rosenfeld concludes that regret and guilt occur in women who have "poor
ability to adapt to normal stress." Id.; see also sources cited infra notes 16-19.
7 Nancy B. Campbell et al., Abortion inAdolescencA 23 AnOLmCENcE 813 (1988), report signif-
icant nightmare and other problems in group members who had aborted during adolescence.
Campbell et al.'s discussion of possible causes did not center on the act of abortion, but on
adolescent development and relationships.
8 Nadja Bums Gould, Post Abortion Depressive Reactions in College Women, 28J. A. C. H.ALTH
Ass'N 316 (1980); Jesse 0. CavenarJr. et al., Aftermath of Abortion: Anniversary Depression and Ab-
dominal Pain, 42 Buu MENNINGER CLINIC 433, 437 (1978), observing in two patients that the
abortion was one of many factors leading to neurotic depression; Jean G. Spaulding &Jesse 0.
Cavenar, Psychoses Following Therapeutic Abortion, 135 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 364 (1978). Spaulding and
Cavenar report two serious anniversary cases in detail. In one case the patient required hospitali-
zation for severe symptoms which occurred "at the time [she] would have had [her] baby." Id. at
365. The patient then experienced "insomnia, anorexia, agitation, and severe depression." Id.;
see also Kathleen Franco et al., Anniversary Reactions and Due Date Responses Following Abortion, 52
PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMICS 151 (1989), finding increased dependency and sleeping disor-
ders in women who, responding to a survey, reported anniversary reactions.
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relationships with men,9 obsessive-compulsive behavior, 10 suicide at-
tempts,1 1 and psychotic and conversion reactions.1 2 One factor which indi-
cates whether a woman will sustain adverse psychiatric or emotional effects
is her prior strength of character;1 3 low self-efficacy also has been found to
indicate that emotional or psychiatric harm may occur. 14 Other factors in-
clude conservative social values and religious beliefs,' 5 high self-character
blame, 16 unresolved conflicts about the pregnancy, 17 poor marital or home
relationships,1 8 present or previous psychiatric contacts,' 9 lack of perceived
9 Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 139.
10 Ronald K. McCraw, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Apparently Related to Abortion, 43 AM. J. Psv-
CHOTHERAPy 269 (1989).
11 C. L. Tishler, Adolescent Suicide Attempts Following Elective Abortion: A Special Case of Anniver-
sary Reaction, 68 PEDIATRICS 670 (1981); see also supra note 8.
Sizing up the patient by outward appearance to determine self-efficacy or the risk of post-
abortion trauma may be inaccurate. Tischer, in the first of two case studies, notes a suicide at-
tempt by a 17 year old who was seen by others as a "well adjusted, high achieving, beautiful
adolescent," but who described herself as good on the outside but depressed inside. Id. at 670.
We may infer that careful pre-abortion counseling may have uncovered indications of this condi-
tion (numerous accidents, drug experimentation, and previous suicide attempts).
12 Henry P. David et al., Postpartum and Post Abortion Psychotic Reactions, 13 FAm. PLAN. PERSP.
88 (1981); Gary D. Tollefson & MichaelJ. Garvey, Conversion DisorderFollowing Termination of Preg-
nan, 16J. FAM. PRAc. 73 (1983). The term "psychosis" was defined by David et al. not as a break
from reality (a common meaning), but as a more general disorder requiring admission to a
psychiatric treatment center. The conclusion emphasized, as do virtually all authors on abor-
tion's psychological impact, that abortion cannot be viewed alone, but must be interpreted with
other factors affecting the patient's health.
13 Joyce L. Dunlop, Counselling of Patients Requesting an Abortion, 220 PRAc. 847 (1978), observ-
ing that teenagers who are psychologically immature are at high risk to acquire post-abortion
stress disorders, especially if the patient values the pregnancy.
14 Dagg, supra note 1, at 582 (describing self-esteem); Catherine Cozzarelli, Personality and
Self-Efficiency as Predictors of Coping with Abortion, 65J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1224 (1993).
Cozzarelli discusses the "overlap" of low self-efficacy with depression. Self-efficacy is an expecta-
tion of doing well in a specific situation and is fundamental to personality. Depression, while
affecting personality, is not integral to it. Cozzarelli treats abortion as a stressful occurrence. See
also Robert Athanasiou et al., Psychiatric Sequelae to Term Birth and Induced Early and Late Abortion: A
Longitudinal Study, 5 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 227 (1973). This early study noted very few serious psy-
chological consequences from abortion in a study of 373 women, and concluded that "patients
whose history shows such characteristics as low self-esteem, high alienation, potentially pathologi-
cal [Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory] patterns, contraceptive naivete, high levels of
sexual activity and delay in seeking an abortion, may represent a special problem in rehabilitative
medicine." Id. at 231. Delay, we may infer, indicates that ambiguity about the abortion is a pre-
dictor of post-abortion emotional trauma.
Gould's work, however, strongly suggests it would be wrong to conclude that only immature
women, or those with low self-efficacy or weak prior character, are at risk. Gould, supra note 8, at
316. Thus, "[t]wo women, both graduate students, experienced depressions at the time of the
expected delivery date. These depressions were characterized by nightmares specifically related
to the baby, insomnia, inability to concentrate on studies, divisiveness in their relationships with
partners, and some suicidal ideation." Id. at 319.
15 Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 138; Marijo B. Tamburrino et al., Postabortion Dysphoria and
Religion, 83 S. MED.J. 736 (1990).
16 Dagg, supra note 1, at 582; Pallas Mueller & Brenda Major, Self-Blame, Self-Efficency, and
Adjustment to Abortion, 57J. PERSONALTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1059 (1989). The Mueller-Major study
preceded Cozzarelli's study, supra note 14, and reported similar findings on self-efficacy.
17 Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 139; see also Campbell et al., supra note 7.
18 McCraw, supra note 10, at 269-70. Dagg similarly reported that "[s]ingle women who
maintained a strong relationship with their partners after the abortion were more likely to experi-
ence regrets at 1 year and had more negative scores on the [Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory] at 6 months." Dagg, supra note 1, at 581 (citing James M. Robbins, Out-of-Wedlock
Abortion and Delivery: The Importance of the Male Partner, 31 Soc. PRoBs. 334 (1984)).
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support on abortion decisions from others,2 0 history of multiple abor-
tions,21 the fact of adolescence itself,2 2 and pressure from others in decid-
ing to have an abortion.23 The risk of depression is also higher in women
who undergo abortions because of medical or genetic reasons than in
those having abortions for psycho-social reasons.2 4 On the other hand, an
abortion after the first trimester is more likely, unless performed for ge-
netic reasons, to cause adverse mental and emotional consequence than
one performed earlier.
2 5
It would be reasonable to expect, therefore, that there would be a
number of reported court cases in which women have asserted claims for
psychological injuries on grounds that they were at predictable high risk to
sustain these injuries from an abortion and were not properly warned of
relevant risks beforehand by the provider. Surprisingly, the little case law
there is does not focus on informed consent or on core questions of consti-
tutional rights but on whether damages are recoverable for the asserted
injury.2 6 Each area, however, is relevant to this Article's basic question and
we should begin with informed consent.
2 7
19 Dagg summarized studies showing feelings of post-abortion guilt in seven to twenty-four
percent of women who had therapeutic abortions with "some degree of psychiatric or other medi-
cal consultation." Dagg, supra note 1, at 581 note a.
20 Id. at 581. Rosenfeld noted that "[t]eenagers who do not tell their parents about their
abortion have an increased incidence of emotional problems and feelings of guilt." Rosenfeld,
supra note 1, at 138; see alsoJudith S. Wallerstein et al., Psychosocial Sequelae of Therapeutic Abortion
in Young Unmarried Women, 27 ARCHvES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 828 (1972).
21 Ellen W. Freeman et al., EmotionalDistress Patterns Among Women HavingFirst or Repeat Abor-
tions, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 630 (1980). Under another view, women with first pregnancies
may be at higher risk. SeeR. C. Hall & S. Zisook, PsychologicalDistress Following Therapeutic Abortion,
8 FEmALE PATIENT 47 (1983).
22 Wanda Franz & David Reardon, Differential Impact of Abortion on Adolescents and Adults, 27
ADOLESCENCE 161 (1992) (suggesting that adolescence itself may be a predictability factor for
post-abortion psychological stress and other negative factors).
23 Dagg noted two studies in which teenagers who made the abortion decision without paren-
tal pressure had fewer adverse emotional effects after abortion than those who experienced pres-
sure. Dagg, supra note 1, at 581-82; see also Campbell et al., supra note 7. Dunlop noted that,
besides the patient, others such as the "husband, boyfriend, mother, previous children" should be
seen "to help clarify hidden stresses which may strongly affect the issue. They may in fact be the
last people to understand the situation correctly, influenced as they are by their own difficulties,
family bias and so on." Dunlop, supra note 13, at 848-49. Thus, what might appear as support for
the abortion could in fact be harmful pressure. See Wallerstein et al., supra note 20, at 832, ob-
serving that "where the women did not centrally participate in the decision making process, the
.experience tended to be regressive overall."
24 ANNE SPECvHARD, THE PsycHo-SociAL AsPEcts OF STRESS FOLLOwrNG ABORTION (1987),
cited in Dagg, supra note 1, at 582. Dagg found consistently that, in women reporting a high
degree of post-abortion mental distress, attachment to the aborted fetus was high. Attachment to
the fetus is, of course, generally equivalent to wanting the pregnancy. See HAROLD I. KAPLAN &
BENJAmINJ. SADocK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY/IV 1054 (4th ed. 1985), discussing
the loss of the wanted pregnancy.
Speckhard reported her sociological study of 30 post-abortion patients who had substantial
stress after abortion. Very common among the women studied were feelings of grief, anger,
victimization, bitterness, disappointment, and hurt, often accompanied by frequent crying.
SPECKHARD, supra, at 40. The women's reaction suggests the existence of a separate post-abortion
syndrome.
25 Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 138.
26 Perhaps not surprisingly. See Layne, supra note 4. Another reason, perhaps, is that post-
abortion trauma cases can arise in persons whom courts may not find to be credible witnesses. See
TolIefson & Garvey, supra note 12, and sources cited supra note 14.
27 Many professional articles focus on informed consent. Bruce C. Recher, Note, Informed
Consent Liability, 26 DRAxE L. REV. 696 (1977), contains a useful summary of policy and rule
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I. A PATIENT'S RIGHTS
The right of the patient to be informed of the consequences of a medi-
cal procedure was articulated by Justice Cardozo in 1914 in Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital,28 who wrote:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs
an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which
he is liable in damages. This is true, except in cases of emergency where
the patient is unconscious, and where it is necessary to operate before
consent can be obtained. 29
In determining whether the patient's right to receive information
about relevant risks before consenting to a procedure was protected, courts
first focused on whether the physician had given the patient advice which a
reasonable physician of the community customarily would have given
under similar circumstances.30 Proof of a violation of this standard was
therefore dependent in most situations upon expert opinion.31 In 1960,
the Kansas Supreme Court in Natanson v. Kline3 2 summarized the physi-
cian's duty:
This rule in effect compels disclosure by the physician in order to assure
that an informed consent of the patient is obtained. The duty of the
physician to disclose, however, is limited to those disclosures which a rea-
sonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar cir-
cumstances. How the physician may best discharge his obligation to the
patient in this difficult situation involves primarily a question of medical
judgment. So long as the disclosure is sufficient to assure an informed
consent, the physician's choice of plausible courses should not be called
into question if it appears, all circumstances considered, that the physi-
cian was motivated only by the patient's best therapeutic interests and he
proceeded as competent medical men would have done in a similar
situation.33
The plaintiff sought recovery in an informed consent action under a bat-
tery theory, but this approach was rejected in a more famous part of Natan-
son. The court held that since a review of professional practice was in issue,
development. Other continuingly relevant articles include Andrea Asaro, TheJudicial Portrayal of
the Physician in Abortion and Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HRv.
WOMEN's LJ. 51 (1983) (writing forthrightly from a feminist perspective); Susan Oliver Renfer et
al., The Woman's Right to Know: A Model Approach to the Informed Consent of Abortion, 22 LoY. U. CHI.
LJ. 409 (1991) (setting out the Model Woman's Informed Choices Act); David E. Seidelson, Lack
of Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice and Product Liability Cases: The Burden of Presenting Evi-
dence, 14 HorsrRA L. Ruv. 621 (1986); AlanJ. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law's Uneasy Com-
promise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. R. 749 (1986); Mary Anne Wood & W. Cole Durham,
Counselin Coasultin& and Consent: Abortion and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 1978 B.Y.U. L REv.
783 (1978).
28 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
29 Id. at 93 (citations omitted).
30 E.g., Grosjean v. Spencer, 140 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1966); see also Recher, supra note 27, at
702.
31 Recher, supra note 27, at 702.
32 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
33 Id. at 1106.
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disputes in informed consent actions should be determined under negli-
gence and not battery principles if the patient had given consent to the
medical procedure.
3 4
By the late 1960s, informed consent law was criticized by commenta-
tors for not focusing on the need of the patient to make an informed
choice on the course of treatment.3 5 In 1972, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Canterbuy v. Spenc0 6 set out new standards to deter-
mine whether information given by a physician to a patient was sufficient to
allow the patient to be properly informed in making the decision to have
or refuse a specific treatment. Its holdings eventually were described in
shorthand fashion as either the patient's rule or the patient autonomy rule;
the previous approach was characterized as the professional rule.3 7 Canter-
bury, which adopted the negligence approach,38 stated that the patient was
entitled to learn from the physician "all risks potentially affecting the deci-
sion."3 9 Whether the physician complied with the duty to inform the pa-
tient was approached on the basis of reasonableness and foresight rather
than hindsight.4° Nonetheless, the inherent and potential hazards of a
proposed treatment,41 the alternatives to this treatment, and the results if a
patient were not treated,42 had to be disclosed to the patient.43 Full disclo-
sure was rejected as impossible. 44 The physician, accordingly, was not obli-
gated to communicate information immaterial to the patient's decision,45
and the duty did not exist if the patient was unconscious 46 or if the pa-
tient's health would be harmed by a discussion of the risks.47
The court was careful to limit exceptions to disclosure, stating:
The physician's privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons
must be carefully circumscribed, however, for otherwise it might devour
the disclosure rule itself. The privilege does not accept the paternalistic
notion that the physician may remain silent simply because divulgence
might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the pa-
tient really needs. That attitude presumes instability or perversity for
34 Id. at 1100-03. Certain jurisdictions have retained a battery instead of a negligence ap-
proach. E.g., Doe v. Dyer-Goode, 566 A.2d 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Cary v. Arrowsmith, 777
S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
35 Among the many articles cited in Canterbwy v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972), isJon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64
Nw. U. L. REv. 628 (1969).
36 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064(1972). Waltz and Scheuneman heavily
influenced the analysis in this case. See Wiesbard, supra note 27, at 759 n.19.
37 Natanson, 350 P.2d 1093, applied the professional rule.
38 Canterbuy, 464 F.2d at 793. The court cited both Schloendorffand Natanson for the general
proposition that informed consent is a fundamental right of all adults. Id. at 780.
39 Id. at 787. In similar language the court stated, "It is the duty to warn of the dangers
lurking in the proposed treatment, and that is surely a facet of due care." Id. at 782.
40 1d at 787.
41 Id. at 781-82.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 786.
45 I. at 787.
46 Id. at 788-89.
47 Id. at 789.
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even the normal patient, and runs counter to the foundation principle
that the patient should and ordinarily can make the choice for himself.48
The physician's advice, the court observed, could not be imposed
upon the patient and, for the consent to be valid, it had to be an expres-
sion of the patient's true choice. 49 The duty to inform the patient of the
risks and options available in a particular procedure thus did not depend
on the patient's actions or the absence of the patient's request.5 0 To sim-
ply answer the patient's questions was not enough to meet the informed
consent requirement. The physician was held to have the duty to "volun-
teer, if necessary, the information the patient needs for intelligent deci-
sion."5 1 Because of the physician's duty to disclose risks and choices to the
patient, Canterbury therefore abolished the professional rule requirement
that the plaintiff by the use of expert evidence prove a violation of the
physician's duty to inform the patient. In defense, the physician could use
expert evidence showing customary disclosure practices, but this evidence
could not normally establish the standard or scope of required
disclosure.
52
Questions of the causal relationship between the lack of informed con-
sent and the patient's damages were to be decided on an "objective" basis.
Thus, the patient's decision was considered an informed decision if it was
"what a prudent person in the patient's position would have decided if
48 Id.
49 Id. at 783.
50 Id. n.36.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 785. The court noted that when medical judgment was involved, as applied to disclo-
sure, "prevailing medical practice must be given its just due." Id. A full discussion on defenses is
beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, observations can be made. Certainly ERISA and
the Federal Tort Claims Act, if applicable, should be carefully reviewed. Defenses generally have
focused on limiting the scope of materiality (what is significant enough to trigger peril and alter-
native warnings) and on whether expert evidence is required to establish elements of the plain-
tiff's case. Diverse results have occurred. Regarding expert testimony, for instance, it has been
held that this testimony is required to establish materiality unless the risk is obvious. E.g., Revord
v. Russell, 401 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980).
Expert testimony on materiality, however, has been held not to be a requirement. E.g., Mallett v.
Pirkey, 466 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1970); see also Griffith v.Jones, 577 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991),
holding that a medical review panel could not give expert evidence on what a reasonable prudent
patient would determine to be material; lay testimony alone would suffice. In Hill v. Ohio Univ.,
610 N.E.2d 634 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988), it was held on materiality that a physician must determine
whether, under the risks, the patient would elect the recommended course of treatment. This
arguably established a professional rule application to the reasonable patient standard. Hill
analysis was based on a mixture of patient's and physician's rule concepts and will therefore
probably not be followed elsewhere. On abortion materiality, see the New York cases discussed
infra text accompanying notes 79-81 and 83-84.
It is important to analyze informed consent cases not only in terms of their immediate hold-
ings, which often center on the need for reliable proof, but also in view of the institutional pur-
poses of the physician-patient relationship. The need for reliable proof (which can be based on
credentials) will tend to re-establish professional rule requirements unless the court specifically
allows for the patient's right to reasonably direct the course of treatment when determining the
standards for reliable proof. It would be easy to cynically dismiss Canterbury as creating a right
that has become an illusion in view of demanding requirements of proof. This would, however,
be incorrect, because once those standards are met, the patient's right to make a reasonable
decision becomes the substantive focus of the litigation.
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suitably informed of all perils bearing significance."53 By requiring that
recoveries be grounded on this standard and not on a particular patient's
subjective values, the rule thus sought to require patients to make decisions
-reasonably.
54
Canterbury, it has been stated, made the informed consent action a
"mainstream" tort,55 and its holdings were adopted shortly thereafter in
'California in Cobbs v. Grant.56 Cobbs held that there is "no physician's duty
to discuss the relatively minor risks inherent in common procedures, when
'it is common knowledge that such risks inherent in the procedure are of
very low incidence."57 This language, of course, required disclosure of re-
mote risks if the consequences were not minor. Cobbs further held that a
patient could refuse to be informed by the physician of particular risks and
alternatives.58
Other states, but certainly not all, quickly followed in adopting the
patient's rule.59 The action which came into being, as stated later in
"Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,60 required the plaintiff to prove
four elements:
1. The existence of a material risk unknown to the patient;
2. A failure to disclose that risk on the part of the physician;
3. Disclosure of the risk would have led a reasonable patient in the
plaintiffs position to reject the medical procedure or choose a differ-
ent course of treatment; [and]
4. Injury.
6 1
53 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791. We should not confuse requirements of expert evidence on
the standard of care required in informing the patient with the requirement that there be proof
(often by competent expert evidence) showing damages were caused by the procedure. Id. at
791-92; see infra text accompanying notes 61-67.
54 anterbury, 464 F.2d at 787, 790-91.
55 Renfer et al., supra note 27, at 411.
56 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
57 Id. at 11.
58 Id. at 12.
59 Adopting the patient's rule early: Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294 (Conn.
1983); Grain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558 (D.C. 1982); Cowman v. Hornaday, 329 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa
1983); Goodwin v. Aema Casualty & Sur. Co., 294 So. 2d 618 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Sard v. Hardy,
379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240 (Mass.
1982); Pultshack v. University of Minn. Hosps., 316 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1982); Reikes v. Martin, 471
So. 2d 385 (Miss. 1985); Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180 (N.M. 1978); Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477
N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1985); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Beauvais v. Notre Dame
Hosp., 387 A.2d 689 (RI. 1978); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (RI. 1972); Peterson v. Shields,
652 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1983); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 349 A.2d 703 (Vt. 1975); Smith v.
Shannon, 666 P.2d 351 (Wash. 1983); Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, (Wash. Ct. App. 1974),
affd, 530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis.
1975).
A careful defense of the physician's rule is found in Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690 (S.C.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 320 S.E.2d 35 (S.C. 1984).
State statutes also have implemented informed consent requirements. Renfer et al. cited
informed consent statutes on specific risks which had been adopted by 1991. Renfer et al., supra
note 27, at 427-28 nn.107-15. Current statutes are collected by LeonardJ. Nelson Il in Informed
Consent, 2 MEDICAL MALPRACrICE [ 22.11 (David W. Louisell & Harold Williams eds., 1987).
Nonetheless, informed consent is seen as a court-made area of the law and not as an area domi-
nated by legislatures. In this respect, it parallels abortion law.
60 408 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987).
61 Id. at 360. The causal relationship has continued to be determined by the prudent person
objective standard. Oklahoma, however, in 1990 adopted a subjective standard based on what the
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To this, we should add a fifth requirement that the patient normally also
had to testify that if the patient had known the risks, the patient would not
have consented to the procedure. 62 The exceptions to the physician's duty
to inform set out in Canterbury and Cobbs, of course, could be asserted af-
firmatively as defenses or could be used to negate the plaintiffs proof in
the determination of liability.63 The new tort thus had become a strict lia-
bility action, because a plaintiff was not required to prove negligence in the
failure to give the requisite information.6
The anticipated impact on medical practice of the emergent tort was
to improve medicine itself by bringing the patient into the decision-making
process. The Rhode Island court, in adopting the patient rule, quoted a
medical-legal authority:
Accordingly, prudent advice to the doctor would seem to be as fol-
lows: All medical procedures have risks (the patient not allergic to peni-
cillin yesterday may be violently so today); the greater the risk, the greater
the duty to inform. Rule of thum& unless therapeutic reasons contraindi-
cate, make a simple, quiet, but honest disclosure commensurate with the
risk in all cases and let the patient choose what risks he wishes to run with
his body. * * *
Besides being good medicine, good humanity, good public relations,
and good medicolegal defense, the preceding advice has a therapeutic
value all its own. The informed and consenting patient, aware of the risk,
is not so shocked should the risk turn up in his case and, if patient-physi-
cian rapport is high, is much less likely to sue his doctor in the first
instance.
65
The actual practice of medicine, where the patient's rule applies (or
might be thought to soon apply), however, may often have been far differ-
ent from the practice anticipated as physicians reacted to the possibility of
informed consent actions. In his article on informed consent, Weisbard
writes:
This apprehension has resulted in some physicians feeling a need to dis-
close virtually all conceivable risks associated with treatment. These per-
ceived "requirements," in addition to their often criticized burdensome
quality to physicians, can lead to a formalistic recitation of a near-endless
patient would have done. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1990), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972). See Seidelson, supra note 27, at 624, for a discussion of causality, its standards of proof,
and their relation to the purposes of informed consent.
62 Seidelson, supra note 27, at 623-24. Does this fifth requirement introduce subjectivity?
Consider Nelson's discussion on Indiana law, supra note 59, especially on Revord v. Russell, 401
N.E.2d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Despite this discussion, requiring proof of what the patient
actually would have done can be seen not as a lessening of the reasonable person test, but as a
requirement that that test be related to actual events. It therefore tends to prevent litigation on
abstract principles not related to the plaintiff's actual intentions. This may be a better reading of
subjectivity factors in cases such as Revord which expressly followed Canterbury on the standard in
determining what is material to require that the patient be informed. Id. at 766-67.
63 The number of exceptions was expanded in Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022-23 (Md.
1977). The additional exceptions are closely consistent with the Canterbury holding with one
exception: the patient need not be informed of risks after requesting not to be informed.
64 Seidelson, supra note 27, at 641.
65 Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 690 (R.I. 1972) (quoting R. CRAWFORD MoRous & ALi
R. MORITZ, DocTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAw (5th ed. 1971)).
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parade of risks so mind-numbing (andperhaps so frightening) as to over-
whelm the patient's capacity to assimilate significant information. The
law's concern with risk disclosure, as it is (mis)understood and put into
practice, may defeat rather than enhance the patient's capacity to utilize
significant information to make sound decisions.
66
Predictably, he writes that this has resulted in
the use of informed consent forms, characterized primarily by their
lengthy recitals of potential risks and by their general unintelligibility to
most patients. These forms are typically presented to patients for signa-
ture the night before the procedure is to be performed, with limited op-
portunity for individualized discussion. So the law is served, the physician
is protected from legal liability, and patient autonomy is "respected."67
If this remains the present practice, then a de facto restoration of the
professional rule, if not the repeal of Schloendoff, has occurred. Using
paperwork, true consultation with the patient is avoided and the physician
able thereby to fully control the direction of treatment. Such practice,
66 Weisbard, supra note 27, at 756. Unduly burdensome informed consent forms specifying
each possible risk are not required. Thus, in Hill v. Ohio Univ., 610 N.E.2d 634 (Ohio Ct. Cl.
1988), it was held as a matter of law that nondisclosure to the patient of a "miniscule risk" of
tissue atrophy from an injection, used after commonly accepted methods to treat allergic rhinitis
had failed, did not establish that the physician had not informed the patient correctly of risk
since a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would very likely have proceeded with treatment.
Id. at 637.
Concentrating solely on the release instrument ignores the role of the physician to effectively
provide information to assist the patient in reaching a decision. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). The release instrument itself is only
evidence of consent and is not conclusive on the issue of whether consent was given. Sard v.
Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Estrada v. Jaques, 321 S.E.2d 240 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984). In
Estrada, a plaintiff suffering from a gunshot wound gave written consent to surgery, but was not
informed of all risks required by the applicable statute. To prove that actual consent was given,
the physician was required to show conclusively "(1) the circumstances surrounding the consent,
(2) the risks inherent in the procedures offered, (3) the standard in the community for obtaining
consent and (4) that the standard was met under the circumstances." Id. at 252. Once the physi-
cian proved these elements, the burden shifted to the plaintiff. In Estrada, to give valid consent,
the plaintiff not only had to know the procedures offered, but also their "'usual and most fre-
quent risks and hazards'.... Estrada could only understand what the surgeons told him." Id. at 253
(citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a) (2) (1981)).
The court in Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986), applying Illinois law,
upheld the efficacy of a written release in a flu vaccination suit where the instrument showed
adequate statistical information on risks, was written in simple language, and the warning allowed
the patient to make up the patient's mind. Furthermore, the patient had had an opportunity,
which was acknowledged by the patient at the time, to review the instrument before signing. Id.
at 1426-28. If we read Estrada and Boruski together, when written releases provide in a simple
manner information necessary to understand the elements of the informed consent, then the
releases will be upheld. If a patient is not told of relevant risks and alternatives, however, and
causally related problems later develop, then the release will be of little value to the defendant.
This implies further that risks and alternatives particular to the patient must be carefully ex-
plained and that form release instruments may often be insufficient. The Estrada community-
standard test, if applied to abortion, however, ought to be the standard of the entire medical
community, not simply the standard of an abortion provider in order to avoid self-creating immu-
nity by the provider. The approaches of these two cases may offer a workable directive, under
current abortion-rights concepts, on what the provider should inform the pre-abortion patient.
67 Weisbard, supra note 27, at 763; see also infra note 137 on abortion practice.
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however, calls into question the sufficiency of any release document signed
by a patient. To claim otherwise is to place form ahead of substance.
68
Weisbard asked whether informed consent can continue as a workable
approach to patient involvement in health care decisions. It is unlikely,
however, that patients will have their role in decision making formally abol-
ished. Counseling of the type anticipated by the Rhode Island court would
arguably cause even over-legalized procedure to become workable. We can
expect, therefore, that the standard of obtaining informed consent in most
areas of medical practice will require detailed written acknowledgement by
the patient of relevant and serious risks of a procedure together with alter-
natives to proposed treatment. This normally will be accompanied by indi-
vidualized pre-release counseling on these factors conducted in a manner
designed to draw out the patient's true intent. This counseling will also
buttress the release instrument. 6
9
II. DAMAGES LIMITATIONS
Even if an informed consent violation in an abortion situation were
proved, however, damages principles may be argued as preventing recovery
for abortion-caused psychological injury. Formerly common, but now di-
minished, was the principle that a plaintiff may not recover for an emo-
tional injury unless the injury arose from, or was at least contemporaneous
with, a physical impact.70 Courts now typically employ a test which allows
recovery for emotional injury with no physical impact only if accompanied
by both a severe causal occurrence and a resulting physical injury.7' These
limitations spring from the need to prevent intentionally false or imagined
claims, to have reliable proof of causation of injury, and to require that
there be foreseeability of the risk in a course of conduct.72 The term physi-
cal injury, however, has been described to include not only injuries with
demonstrable physical cause, but also emotional conditions which are ca-
68 Fraud, deceit, duress, and other actions will no doubt occur to attorneys for women who
have not been properly advised of both abortion options and alternatives to the procedure.
69 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denieA 409 U.S. 1064 (1972),
emphasized that at times a physician must be a teacher to instruct the patient on risks and op-
tions, which requires more than simply presenting information.
70 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., S THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.4 (2d ed. 1986). Harper et al. noted
that the impact requirement "is distinctly the minority rule today" and set out detailed authority
for this position. Id. at 687; STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 4 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §§ 16.7-8
(1992). Speiser et al. concluded much the same, referring to the impact rule memorably as
"atavistic primitivism." Id. at 992.
Limitations on recovery for negligently inflicted emotional injury do not normally apply to
damages caused by intentional and outrageous conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 435A (1963).
71 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 70, at § 18.4; SPEISER ET At., supra note 70, §§ 16:7-8. By focus-
ing on cause of injury and specific conduct to be prevented, the new test brings rationality and
moral judgment to the law. Contextually, the change to the physical damages rules was made
primarily in bystander cases (plaintiffs suffered emotional-psychological harm after observing an-
other being negligently injured) and near-miss actions (plaintiffs perceived narrowly escaped
death or terrible injury due to defendants' negligence). Emotional injury not having a severe
cause is therefore not generally compensable.
72 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 70, at § 18.4; see also SPEISER ET AL., supra note 70, §§ 16:7-8.
With abortion, it follows that if the procedure is deemed minor, or if a woman's reaction to the
loss of a pregnancy is thought to be of small consequence, then no recovery under the physical
damages test could be allowed for emotional harm since it was not foreseeable.
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pable of being objectively proved. 78 As knowledge of psychological injury
expands, we may, therefore, expect that previously unprovable causal rela-
tionships will be subject to objective demonstration.
Exceptions to the rule requiring underlying physical injury have been
formulated in health care cases. The Iowa Supreme Court, for example,
has allowed recovery against health care providers for emotional injury
caused largely by injurious remarks during labor to a mother and father
whose baby was thought to be stillborn, but was then discovered to have
been born alive.74 The patient's statements that she needed help were not
acted upon. The court, while observing that the parent's claim for dam-
ages normally would not be allowed in the absence of physical injury, stated
specifically with respect to health care providers that "an exception ex-
ists ... where the nature of the relationship between the parties is such that
there arises a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid causing emotional
harm."75 The North Carolina Supreme Court in Johnson v. Ruark Obstet-
Iics,76 in a claim for damages for a stillborn baby, reached a similar result
when it allowed for potential recovery for "severe emotional distress"
77
where the distress was foreseeable without requiring physical impact or
physical injury.
78
73 In Petition of United States, 418 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1969) (admiralty action), plaintiff re-
covered for psychiatric injury occurring when he was swept to sea as his ship sank. This lead to
"severe neurosis of an anxiety reaction type with depressive features ... that... is chronic in
nature. ... " Id. at 267. For further general background, see Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163
(Colo. 1978), which abolished the impact rule and allowed medical evidence of emotional or
psychological injury. The court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(2) (1965),
which stated:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily
harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and
immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the inter-
nal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from
liability.
The court also cited Comment (c) to § 436A "On the other hand, long continued nausea or
headaches may amount to physical illness, which is bodily harm; and even long continued mental
disturbance, as for example in the case of repeated hysterical attacks, or mental aberration, may
be classified by the courts as illness, notwithstanding their mental character."
Applied to abortion, long continued disturbances such as sleeping disorders, anniversary
reactions, or obsessive-compulsive behavior could by analogy be seen as bodily harm, with correct
proof of severity. See supra notes 7-8 and 10.
74 Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634, 636-37 (Iowa 1990).
75 Id. at 639. The court cited Iowa cases allowing recovery for negligence with telegrams
"announcing the death of a close relative" and for negligence in handling a funeral. Id. The
court also cited Geibel v. United States, 667 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. Pa 1987), which is of doubtful
value, but also Taylor v. Baptist Medical Ctr., 400 So. 2d. 369 (Ala. 1981), which allowed recovery
for emotional injury in a breach of contract case. Recovery could be allowed if the defendant's
relationship to plaintiff was "so coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with the
feelings of the party to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or
reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering." Id. at 374.
76 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990) (denying motion for summary judgment on liability).
77 Id. at 95-96. A comparison of Johnson to Petition of United States, discussed supra note 73,
shows both courts headed in the same direction of allowing recovery for provable emotional
injury of consequence to the victim.
78 Johnson, 395 S.E.2d at 93-94. The holding in Johnson was founded on a thorough discus-
sion of North Carolina law regarding negligently inflicted emotional injury. The court held that
damages arising from a contractual relationship could be recovered either in a breach of contract
action or in a tort action if causation and foreseeability were present. Id. at 97. Further, "a
plaintiff must also allege that severe emotional distress was the foreseeable and proximate result
of such negligence in order to state a claim; mere temporary fright, disappointment or regret will
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Damages issues have been thought to be crucial in several recent cases
in which claims were brought by patients for abortion-caused damages. In
Martinez v. Long IslandJewish Hillside Medical Center,79 the plaintiff recovered
against the medical center and genetic counselors who negligently told her
that the baby would be born with microcephaly or anencephaly (small
brain or no brain). The plaintiff relied on their statements and had a first
trimester abortion. She subsequently learned that her aborted fetus had a
normal head size, which caused her "mental anguish and depression."80
The court considered whether recovery would be permitted in cases in
which the plaintiff was not injured (implying that the abortion procedure
was not physically injurious) and there was no intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover, stating that "the
emotional distress for which she seeks recovery does not derive from what
happened to the fetus; it derives from the psychological injury directly
caused by her agreeing to an act which, as the jury found, was contrary to
her firmly held religious beliefs."8'
The Kansas Supreme Court, however, in Humes v. Clinton,8 2 retained
the use of the physical injury standard in considering a patient's claim for
emotional injuries against an abortion provider. The patient had received
no pre-operative advice on possible physical or psychological problems as-
sociated with having an abortion, but the court held that the failure to
warn the plaintiff of possible harm did not give rise to a cause of action
unless the patient had sustained physical injury. Subsequently, another
New York case, Ferrara v. Bernstein,83 allowed recovery for damages for emo-
tional injury sustained when the plaintiff had a miscarriage after a failed
abortion. The court justified the recovery by stating that the pain due to
not suffice." Id. The court continued: "'[s]evere emotional distress' means any emotional or
mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any
other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recog-
nized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so." Id
Foreseeability was to be determined on a case-by-case basis using factors which include "the
plaintiff's proximity to the negligent act, the relationship between the plaintiff and the other
person.., and whether the plaintiff personally observed a negligent act." Id. at 98. A dissent by
Justice Meyer argued for a foreseeability standard that would limit the class of potential plaintiffs
and which would determine-instead of simply describe-foreseeabiity. Id. at 101 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting). The dissent further argued that extensions of recovery should be made only under
cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 102. The majority and the dissent discussed damages in terms of the
bystander doctrine, which may not logically be the correct damages concept to employ in an
abortion situation. See Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y.
1987), discussed infia text accompanying notes 79-81. Regardless of whether a bystander ap-
proach is used, the issues raised in North Carolina may be expected to be encountered elsewhere
and the discussion forms a framework for damages issues analysis.
Analogous holdings requiring foreseeability as a key to the recovery of damages for eco-
nomic loss are also replacing tests requiring actual physical injury to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's
property. See Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Bums Elec. Sec. Serv., 417 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980); Nelson v. Todd's Ltd., 426 N.W.2d 120 (Iowa 1988) (products liability cases).
79 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987).
80 Id. at 538.
81 Id. at 539.
82 792 P.2d 1032 (Kan. 1990).
83 582 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. Div. 1992), affd, 613 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 1993).
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the childbirth or miscarriage experience was a physical injury which would
not have occurred if the abortion had been fully completed.
84
Of these cases, Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, by requiring that there be
foreseeability of emotional injury (a negligence concept which easily trans-
lates to the material risk of strict liability) and that recovery for this injury
be limited to serious situations, provides a comprehensive approach to the
question of whether damages for emotional harm should be awarded ab-
sent physical injury. Certainly, if the law seeks to prevent and redress fore-
seeable serious emotional injury stemming from informed consent
violations, recovery in abortion situations ought not be limited to the unu-
sual factual circumstances illustrated by Martinez and Ferrara. Recovery
should require reliable proof of the psychological or emotional injury.
Physical injury or impact tests will be of little use in categorizing claims
since these elements arguably will be present in all abortions without in-
formed consent. If, however, a physical injury standard is used, objective
proof of severe emotional injury should be viewed as constituting proof of
physical injury. Failing to allow recovery for psychological injury based on
reliable proof will serve no goal except to immunize abortion providers
from responsibility for poor practice in advising patients of perils and
alternatives.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ABORTION CONSENT
Shortly after Canterbury v. Spence,85 the United States Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade86 held that the Texas criminal statute8 7 forbidding a woman
from having an abortion, except to save her life, violated the woman's right
to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's "concept of per-
sonal liberty."88 Roe v. Wade, together with its companion, Doe v. Bolton,
89
cast states as protectors of potential human life, but forbade them from
preventing abortions in the first trimester of pregnancy. Roe also allowed
84 Id. at 676. In Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical & Gynecological Assocs., 532 N.E.2d 1239
(N.Y. 1988), the court allowed damages for an abortion undertaken by the patient because of
incorrect medical advice. After being told that she was not pregnant, the patient took a drug
known to create a risk of birth injuries. She subsequently discovered she was pregnant, and had
an abortion because of the potential injury to the child. The dissent argued that the physical
consequences of a "normal abortion" are not sufficient to allow recovery for emotional injury. Id.
at 1242. This argument was rejected by the court, but illustrates the view that abortion is of little
physical consequence, a perspective which dominated the opinions of the United States Supreme
Court until Casey. See infra text accompanying notes 184-205. The Lynch dissent is echoed in
Ferrara, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 678-80 (Murphy, J., concurring).
The illustration provided in the comment to § 436(2) of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS did not permit recovery if a team of horses only frightened a woman in a near-miss situa-
tion. But if the team of horses so frightened her and caused her to miscarry, the physical injury
she sustained sufficed to allow recovery. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 436 cmt. C, illus. 2
(1965). While this comment was meant to, illuminate shock and emotional injury, see supra note
73, the use of a miscarriage as an underlying physical injury sufficient to allow recovery is unmis-
takable. The loss of a child (fetus) in abortion due to an informed consent violation would,
accordingly, satisfy the physical injury requirement.
85 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
86 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
87 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191-1194, 1196.
88 Roe, 410 at 153, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
89 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
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the states little authority to restrain later abortions even after the fetus was
"viable." Only upon fetal viability were states allowed to partially restrain
the right to abortion.90 States were allowed broad powers, however, which
the Court set out in detail, to protect the physical health of women. 91 Ob-
taining an abortion was made a fundamental right. State limitations on
that right were to be analyzed, consequently, under a strict scrutiny test in
which only a compelling state interest would allow curtailment of the right
to abortion. 92 In contrast, the standard used to review a state statute not
involving a fundamental right provided that a statute attacked on due pro-
cess grounds would be found constitutionally valid if it had a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate state purpose.93
Regarding informed consent, in Roe v. Wade the Court quoted Stan-
dards for Abortion Services of the Executive Board of the American Public Health
Association, which provided:
a. Rapid and simple abortion referral must be readily available through
state and local public health departments, medical societies, or other
non-profit organizations.
b. An important function of counseling should be to simplify and expe-
dite the provision of abortion services; it should not delay the ob-
taining of these services.
c. Psychiatric consultation should not be mandatory. As in the case of
other specialized medical services, psychiatric consultation should be
sought for definite indications and not on a routine basis.
d. A wide range of individuals from appropriately trained, sympathetic
volunteers to highly skilled physicians may qualify as abortion
counselors.
e. Contraception and/or sterilization should be discussed with each
abortion patient.
94
These standards contained no concept that harm could regularly come to
women from abortions. Counseling which was to serve, as the verb went, to
"expedite" the decision to abort thus had the purpose of overcoming any
ambiguities of thought, morality, or sentiment the patient may have had
about abortion. The absence of concern over a woman's psychological
response to the stress of the decision was further reflected injustice Black-
mun's comments on the impact of pregnancy on a woman:
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be immi-
90 The Roe v. Wade trimester-viability test is almost universally known. Third trimester regula-
tions (post-viability protection) were dependent on state action if the state "is interested," but
could be overcome if abortion was "necessary to prelerve the life or health of the mother." Roe,
410 U.S. at 163-64, 93 S. Ct. at 732.
91 Id. at 149-51, 93 S. Ct. at 725.
92 Id. at 155-56, 93 S. CL at 728.
93 E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S. Ct. 461 (1955). The rational
relationship test, if employed in abortion cases, would no doubt have allowed substantial state
curtailment of unlimited subjectivity by patients in determining whether they should have abor-
tions. SeeJustice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173, 93 S. Ct. 705, 737 (1973).
94 Roe, 410 U.S. at 144-45, 93 S. Ct. at 722-23.
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nent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child,
and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one,
the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood
may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible
physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
95
Justice Blackmun did, however, discuss with favorable reference the
preambles to American Medical Association resolutions which "emphasize
'the best interests of the patient,' 'sound clinical judgment,' and 'informed
patient consent,' in contrast to 'mere acquiescence to the patient's de-
mand.'" 96 He nonetheless did not specify informed consent standards
which states could employ in protecting the psychological health of women
having abortions. Several reasons for this may exist. The petitioners were
women who wanted to have abortions and, from a careful opinion-writing
position, there was no reason to address informed consent since it was not
raised by the parties. More likely, since the opinion was so legislative in
character (as evidenced by the creation of the trimester system and the
specific delineations of a state's right to protect women's physical health),
the Court would have established patients' informed consent rights, be-
yond setting out those necessary to facilitate the abortion, had it thought it
necessary to do so. Inferentially, if not expressly, the Court simply did not
consider abortion to be a medical procedure with likely adverse psychologi-
cal results for significant numbers of women. Consistently, Justice Black-
mun saw the abortion decision as the physician's decision. In Doe v. Bolton,
he wrote:
[M] edical judgment may be exercised in light of all factors-physical,
emotional, psychological, familial, and the women's age-relevant to the
well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health. This al-
lows the attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical
judgment. And it is room that operates for the benefit, not the disadvan-
tage, of the pregnant woman.
9 7
The Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton holdings were criticized by members
of the Court. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, stating
the Court was wrong to place the woman's subjective decision above the
right to legislate in the area.98 Justice Rehnquist also dissented separately,
objecting both to legislation by the judiciary and to the compelling state
interest standard that state legislation on abortion would thereafter have to
meet.9 9 Justice Stewart, concurring with the majority, observed that the
standard to apply was the protection of liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 0 0 No one, Justice White perhaps excepted, saw a danger to
women. The substantial exclusion of the patient from the abortion deci-
95 Id. at 153, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
96 Id. at 143, 93 S. Ct. at 722.
97 Doe, 410 U.S. at 192, 93 S. Ct. at 747.
98 Id. at 221-23, 93 S. Ct. at 762-63 (White, J., dissenting).
99 Roe, 410 U.S. at 171-77, 93 S. Ct. at 736-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 167-71, 93 S. Ct. at 733-36 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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sion process in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton soon, however, was attacked as
paternalistic from a pro-abortion rights perspective, which paralleled the
criticism leveled at the professional rule. 10 1
Working without precisely articulated informed consent standards;
several states and at least one state government subdivision, the City of Ak-
ron, Ohio, sought to require that physicians or abortion providers present
detailed information to women for their consideration in reaching a deci-
sion on whether to have an abortion. Beginning with Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth,10 2 and followed by City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health,103 Thornburg v. American College of Obstetrics and Gyne-
cologists'0 4 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1
05
majorities or pluralities on the Court attempted to describe and define in-
formed consent in the abortion situation. In each of these cases, the Court
analyzed criminal statutes or ordinances or medical licensing regulations
which required that specified information be provided to potential abor-
tion patients. It is an interesting comment on American justice that these
cases were brought without the participation of the potential patients.
Prior to Casey, it was assumed that the patient's position in abortion cases
was articulated by the abortion provider and that opposition to the wo-
man's right to an abortion, which was seen as a remnant of an obsolete
morality, was represented by the states. Court challenges proceeded, al-
most oddly, with these participants assuming the roles that had been estab-
lished for them in Roe v. Wade. This became critically important because
due process rights, which the Court used to establish and maintain lawful
abortion, limit governmental power and do not normally limit private ac-
tion.106 As states sought to expand their rights to require informed con-
sent protection for women considering abortions, they were attacked on
the grounds that their legislated protections were nothing more than sub
rosa reassertions of state anti-abortion positions outlawed in Roe v. Wade.
Had women been true parties (and not simply nominal parties) to actions
seeking the recognition of informed consent rights in the abortion con-
text, these counterarguments could not have been easily assertable.
In 1976, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,07 the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a Missouri statute'08 which provided
that a woman seeking an abortion during the first twelve weeks of preg-
101 See Asaro, supra note 27. Asaro does not argue that the Court's desire to protect women
from graphic reality may have been on founded on pro-abortion views rather than paternalistic
notions. She is, however, unflinching in her observations thatJustice Blackmun's position dispar-
ages the rights of women. "Unfortunately,... Blackmun subsumed the woman's right to privacy
within the ambit of the doctor-patient relationship, and ultimately subordinated her interest to
the physicians." Id. at 53. "The physician emerges as independent and omniscient, championing
his right to practice medicine." Id. at 61.
102 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
103 462 U.S. 416, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
104 476 U.S. 747, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
105 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
106 See Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 94 S. Ct. 2416 (1974); District of Columbia v.
Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 93 S. Ct 602 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959, 93 S. Ct. 1410 (1973)
(mem.).
107 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).




nancy must, before the abortion, certify in writing that she consented to an
abortion and "that her consent is informed and fully given and not the
result of coercion." 10 9 The statute was challenged on the grounds that it
violated the constitutional guarantees established by Roe v. Wade, and that it
was burdensome, vague, and overbroad."10 Appearing to recognize the
value of the right to informed consent in an abortion decision, Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court, stated:
the decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one,
and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of
its nature and consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned
and her awareness of the decision and its significance may be assured,
constitutionally, by the State to the extent of requiring her written prior
consent."'
The vagueness challenge focused on the meaning of the terms "in-
formed" or "informed consent." The Court stated in a footnote that the
terms meant "the giving of information to the patient as to just what would
be done and as to its consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this
might well confine the attending physician in an undesired and uncomfort-
able straitjacket in the practice of his profession."' 12 The Court, while stat-
ing that it recognized the woman's right to make a decision upon her
informed knowledge of risks and alternatives, thus relied on logic consis-
tent with an abbreviated application of the professional rule rather than
the patient's rule in setting out standards for states to follow in abortion
informed consent procedures.113 Again the protection of the physician was
paramount and, while the opinion stated that it was upholding the statute,
the powers it conveyed to the physician wrecked the stated purpose of the
statute, which was to protect the right of the woman to be in charge of the
abortion decision.
109 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65, 96 S. Ct. at 2839.
110 Id. at 66, 96 S. Ct. at 2839.
111 Id. at 67, 96 S. CL at 2840.
112 Id. at 67 n.8, 96 S. Ct. at 2840 n.8. From a professional rule perspective, sole reliance on
the physician's discretion or judgment, as set out by Justice Blackmun, is unworkable to effect
informed consent since the physician is required to disclose to the patient those risks which other
physicians would reasonably disclose. See supra text accompanying note 33. Under the patient's
rule, as expressed in Canterbuy, the physician has to state all relevant risks and alternatives unless
there is a medical reason not to do so, an exception which the Canterbuy court carefully limited.
Seesupra text accompanying note 48. If it is arguable, and I think it is not, thatJustice Blackmun's
abortion-consent rationale is an adoption of the Canterbwy medical-reason exception, then the
Court imposed that exception not because of particular patient needs, but because of the pecu-
liar nature of the enterprise.
The Court's view, which made life choice a medical matter, carried a somber, albeit unwit-
ting, echo of the Eichmann trial. In Chapter Five of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt de-
scribed the arguments of defendant's counsel, Robert Servatius, on the destruction of European
Jews, that killing was a medical matter. She also observed the shocked initial disbelief of the
presidingjustice that in fact he had heard that argument. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN INJERUSA-
t~m 69 (Penguin Books 1963).
113 Asaro argues that women's exclusion from the decision process is traced to the fact that
most physicians are male. Asaro, supra note 27, at 51. But we should ask whether the patient
exclusion would be any more justifiable if most physicians were female.
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In 1983, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,' 4 Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, struck down as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment privacy interests expressed in Roe v. Wade a municipal ordi-
nance' 15 which set precise standards for physicians in providing informa-
tion to prospective abortion patients. 1 6 The stated purpose of the
ordinance was to prohibit an abortion unless the pregnant woman had
"freely and without coercion" given "informed written consent."'" 7 To this
end, the attending physician was required to tell the woman "of the status
of her pregnancy, the development of her fetus, the date of possible viabil-
ity, the physical and emotional complications that may result from an abor-
tion, and the availability of agencies to provide her with assistance and
information with respect to birth control, adoption, and childbirth."
'" 8
The attending physician likewise was obligated to inform the patient of
"particular risks associated with her own pregnancy," the method of abor-
tion, and other relevant information that the physician determined would
assist the patient in making her decision on whether to have an
abortion." 9
The Court stated that Danforth's informed consent language was still
valid, 120 and held that a state may not define life differently than it was
defined in Roe v. Wade.' 2 ' The Court stated that no restriction could be
placed on a woman's decision "in consultation with her physician" to have
an abortion in the first trimester. 22 Further, the Court found that the or-
dinance's informed consent language was not intended to inform a woman
about her choice, but rather had the purpose of dissuading her from pro-
ceeding with an abortion.' 2 3 Abortion was reaffirmed as a "fundamental
right."1
24
The Akron ordinance imposed a twenty-four hour waiting period after
giving written consent before an abortion could be performed so that a
woman would have time for "careful consideration" before proceeding.'2
This provision was declared invalid on the grounds that the waiting period
was "arbitrary and inflexible," and furthered no legitimate state interest.1
2 6
The Court again stated the importance of giving "the physician adequate
discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment." 2 7 The Court
declared:
114 462 U.S. 416, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
115 AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES, §§ 1870.03, 1870.05, 1807.06, 1807.07, 1807.16
(1978).
116 Akron, 462 U.S. at 442-52, 103 S. Ct. 2499-504.
117 Id. at 442, 103 S. Ct. at 2499.
118 Id. at 416, 103 S. Ct. at 2485.
119 Id. at 423, 103 S. Ct. at 2488.
120 Id. at 442-43, 103 S. Ct. at 2499-500.
121 Id. at 444-45, 103 S. Ct. at 2500.
122 Id. at 429-31, 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
123 Id. at 444, 103 S. Ct. at 2500.
124 Id. at 427, 103 S. Ct. at 2491.
125 Id. at 449-50, 103 S. Ct. at 2503. Many opinions on state-legislated waiting periods have
been written, but because of the Casey holdings, discussed infra notes 184-205 and accompanying
text, they do not form a part of this Article.
126 Akron, 462 U.S. at 450, 103 S. CL at 2503.
127 Id. (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387, 99 S. Ct. 675, 681 (1979)).
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In accordance with the ethical standards of the profession, a physician
willadvise the patient to defer the abortion when he thinks this will be
beneficial to her. But if a woman, after appropriate counseling, is pre-
pared to give her written informed consent and proceed with the abor-
tion, a State may not demand that she delay the effectuation of that
decision.
128
The Court separately held that the requirement that the physician per-
sbnally advise the patient was constitutionally invalid, and that the duty to
inform the woman of risks could be delegated to nonphysician counsel-
ors. 129 The Roe v. Wade view, which did not perceive abortion as potentially
psychologically damaging to women, 8 0 became even more intense as the
Court characterized the ordinance's description of abortion as "a major
surgical procedure" as a "dubious statement,"' 3' and accepted the district
court's finding that "an abortion generally is considered a 'minor surgical
procedure.'"' 3 2 Advice on medical consequences was termed a "parade of
horribles." 3 3 Included in that parade was language from the ordinance
stating "that abortion may leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any
'existing psychological problem she may have and can result in severe emo-
tional disturbances."'1
When Akron was decided, Ohio had not yet adopted the patient's rule.
The Court chose not to use state law to ascertain the patient's rights, pre-
sumably ignoring the information that the state would normally require to
be given in any other medical procedure. 35 The Court also did not adopt
the view of the Akron district court that the protection of the woman, not
the physician, was the proper focus of constitutional inquiry. 36 The
Court's embrace of the concept that the physician is in charge of informa-
tion to be given the prospective abortion patient was limited only by the
minimal requirements of Danforth.13 7 Informed consent in the criminal
128 Id. at 450-51, 103 S. Ct. at 2503.
129 Id. at 448-49, 103 S. Ct. at 2502.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
131 Akron, 462 U.S. at 444, 103 S. Ct. at 2500.
132 I& at 444 n.35, 103 S. Ct. at 2500 n.35.
133 Id. at 445, 103 S. Ct. at 2500.
134 Id. at 445 n.36, 103 S. Ct. at 2500 n.36.
135 Ohio adopted the patient's rule two years after Akron in Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d
1145 (Ohio 1985). If the Akron decision had been founded on state law, the professional rule
would have required at least a basic disclosure of risks to the patient. See supra note 112. Subse-
quent adoption of the patient's rule would have required reasonably complete disclosure of con-
sequences, risks, and options to almost all potential abortion patients.
The Akron Court noted that abortion has "implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment" and states therefore have an interest in assuring that
the patient's informed consent is secured. Akron, 462 U.S. at 443, 103 S. Ct. at 2499 (quoting
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3051 (1979)). The states' interest, however,
does not extend to requiring that specific information be presented to the patient before the
abortion decision. Logical analysis, if women considering abortion are to have informed consent
rights, would compel the reverse conclusion.
136 Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. City ofAkron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
137 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 429-30, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2492-
93 (1983). Speckhard noted that 92 percent of the 30 subjects in her study of women who had
sustained significant stress after abortion found the informed consent procedure used by their
clinic "inadequate." Dagg, supra note 1 (citing SPECKHARD, supra note 24). These "procedures"
show that the clinics virtually abandon informed consent measures other than to obtain the pa-
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law abortion context consequently fell in a range somewhere between eu-
phemism and nullity. Although insulating abortion providers from crimi-
nal prosecution, the Court nonetheless recognized the abortion providers'
responsibility to properly inform their patients on relevant factors. Infer-
entially, this would have allowed informed consent civil suits against them
by patients who were ill-informed on abortion risks and subsequently devel-
oped adverse emotional or psychological conditions causally related to the
abortion. 1
38
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, argued in
dissent that states should have the right to regulate abortion unless state
restrictions became an undue burden on the right to have an abortion.
139
The dissent maintained that the trimester system, made obsolete by medi-
cal advances, was a poor way of allowing the states' interests to be "accom-
modated" with the woman's right. Further, the dissent argued that, under
the undue burden standard, the state should be allowed to assert its inter-
est in fetal life at all times including the first trimester. 140 Since Akron's
informed consent provisions did not impose a drastic burden on abortion
rights, the dissent argued that the statute should not be invalidated.
14'
This, of course, advanced a lesser protection of the abortion right guaran-
tee than did the fundamental rights test previously adopted.
The concept that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state from re-
quiring that a physician give a patient full information about an abortion,
however, was again upheld in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics &
Gynecologists'4 2 in 1989. In Thornburgh, the Court struck down a Penn-
sylvania statute' 43 which required the physician to inform the woman of
"detrimental physical and psychological effects" of abortion, reasoning that
the statute's effect would be to "increase the patient's anxiety, and intrude
upon the physician's exercise of proper professional judgment."' 44 Li-
cense revocation, not criminal penalty, was imposed on physicians who vio-
lated the statute.145 Criminal penalties were, however, imposed on any
other persons required to give information. 46 Justice Blackmun, writing
for the Court, reasserted the validity of the Danforth and Akron holdings and
tient's signature on the form. The clinics often required the signature when the patient checked
in without "explanations" or "time to read the printed form." Speckhard, supra note 24, at 70-71.
This 1984 study arguably shows a perceived immunity from common informed-consent require-
ments. Incident to described clinic practices, punitive damages claims are not in the scope of this
Article.
138 It is exceedingly doubtful that the Court was hinting at the possibility of a civil suit, given
the emphasis on protection of the abortion provider. Nonetheless, the existence of the civil
remedy inheres in the opinion, giving women standing to assert what states could not.
139 Akron, 462 U.S. at 452-53, 461-66, 103 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 452-61, 103 S. Ct. 2504-09.
141 If adopted, this position would also have made early (including first trimester) counseling
subject to state regulation. Requirements which did not create an "undue burden" on the right
to have an abortion would thus be permitted.
142 476 U.S. 747, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
143 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 3205 (informed consent), 3208 (printed information), 3210(b)-(c)
(postviability abortions), 3211 (a) (reporting requirements), 3214(a) & (h) (reporting require-
ments) (1982).
144 Thornburg, 476 U.S. at 764, 106 S. Ct. at 2180-81.




focused on a comparison of the abortion consent statute with other re-
quirements of Pennsylvania's medical practice. He did not discuss in-
formed consent comprehensively, but prevented its applicability by state
action to abortion. Remarkably, Justice Blackmun argued that since Penn-
sylvania did not require a disclosure "of every possible peril of necessary
surgery or of simple vaccination," that the statute had an anti-abortion
character and thus a defective purpose. 147 Citing no authority, he observed
that "compelled information is the antithesis of informed consent."' 48
The Pennsylvania statute also required abortion providers to permit
patients to examine state-furnished materials which described the fetus and
alternatives to abortion. Justice Blackmun found that portion of the statute
"an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging
abortion into the privacy of informed consent dialogue between the wo-
man and physician." 149 Finding that women should be protected against
information, he found the required fetal development information to be
"plainly overinclusive" which "may serve only to confuse and punish her
and to heighten her anxiety, contrary to accepted medical practice." 50
The Court was again far from unanimous, and a woman's supposed
right to informed consent was finally taken up in the dissents. Chief Justice
Burger professed amazement that Pennsylvania's informed consent provi-
sions were not constitutional, stating:
Can anyone doubt that doctors routinely give similar information con-
cerning risks in countless procedures having far less impact on life and
health, both physical and emotional than an abortion, and risk a malprac-
tice lawsuit if they fail to do so?' 51
He then asked whether the Court had ruled "that the constitution forbids
the communication of such critical information to a woman?"' 52
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, attacked the concept that
abortion should be treated as a fundamental right.153 This was partially
based on the scientific observation that a fetus has the same type of genetic
information as any other member of the human species. No easy line dis-
tinguished a fetus from a child or an adult' 54 A free society, Justice White
argued, "does not presuppose any particular rule or set of rules with re-
147 Id. at 764, 106 S. Ct. at 2180-81. As in Akron, no discemable attempt was made to deter-
mine if, under state law, a woman would be entitled beforehand to reasonably full information on
risks of necessary surgery. The Court's comparison of abortion information requirements to in-
formation required for a simple vaccination is a reduction to the absurd argument at gross vari-
ance with the Court's pronouncements in Akron and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035
(1979), that abortion has broad and serious implications. The reference to "every possible peril"
describes an informed consent standard which is nonexistent. As noted in Canterbuiy, all risks
cannot be discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 36-52, especially note 44. Correct analy-
sis normally would allow for latitude with this language. Its context, however, demonstrates that
it is intended to be read nearly literally-if not literally.
148 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764, 106 U.S. at 2180-81.
149 Id. at 762, 106 S. Ct. at 2179.
150 Id- None of the opinions attacked the truthfulness of the information required to be
made available.
151 Id. at 783, 106 S. Ct. at 2190 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 783, 106 S. Ct. at 2190-91.
153 Id. at 785-98, 106 S. Ct. at 2192-98 (White, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 792, 106 S. Ct. at 2195.
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spect to abortion." 155 Inferentially, this was to be left to legislation. 15 6 On
informed consent, Justice White cited Canterbury5 7 and argued that a wo-
man's freedom of choice should be preserved. The Pennsylvania statute,
he concluded, did in fact promote choice and therefore was distinguish-
able from the informed consent provisions in Akron, which he viewed as
state propaganda.
158
Separately dissenting, and also joined by Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O'Connor re-emphasized her dissent in Akron that state abortion statutes
should be upheld if they promote, and are rationally related to, the states'
basic interests in protecting maternal health or human life. Only if the
statute imposed an undue burden on the abortion right would it then be
subject to strict scrutiny, implying, of course, a consequent finding of un-
constitutionality. 159 Applying the undue burden formulation, which she
argued inhered in the abortion jurisprudence of the Court, Justice
O'Connor stated that the Pennsylvania informed consent statute was valid.
It did not contain the "parade of horribles" of Akron and risk information
was required only when it was "medically accurate" to furnish it.160 Since
the physician also had to inform the patient of the risks of proceeding to
'term,' Justice O'Connor concluded, noting Justice White's argument on
informed consent, that the information required by Pennsylvania was
balanced.1
61
The majorities and pluralities of the Court, we may conclude, while
using the language of informed consent from Roe v. Wade through Thorn-
burgh, perceived abortion primarily politically. Consequently, truthful
medical information to be given a woman considering an abortion was
seen as an interference with her right, an intrusion into her privacy, and
not valuable to help her reach a knowledgeable decision. By accepting the
arguments of the abortion providers, the Court failed to provide for in-
formed consent rights asserted not only in Canterbury and in Cobbs v.
Grant,16 2 but also carefully allowed for under the professional rule as shown
by Natanson v. Kline.163
That terrible psychological health consequences could come from the
abortion decision did not take hold on the Court. With this background it
was logical that informed consent actions would not be brought. Ferrara v.
Bernstein,'64 which allowed the patient damages for a negligently incom-
plete abortion, may not be viewed as an informed consent case.' 65 Martinez
155 Id. at 793, 106 S. Ct. at 2196.
156 Id. at 794 n.3, 106 S. Ct. at 2196 n.3. The argument is succinct and ought to be read rather
than further summarized.
157 Id. at 799, 106 S. Ct. at 2199 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
158 Id. at 800, 106 S. Ct. at 2199.
159 Id. at 828-31, 106 S. Ct. at 2213-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 830, 106 S. Ct. at 2215. The statutory term "medically accurate" surely was an at-
tempt to cure the Akron ordinance requirement that medical information which was irrelevant or
incorrect as applied to a particular case still had to be conveyed to the patient.
161 Id.
162 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); see supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
163 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960); see supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
164 582 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1992).
165 Ferrara is useful, however, for its ruling that injuries caused by abortion providers which fall
outside the scope of patient's executed release instrument are actionable. This ruling would
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-. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center'66 established that the patient
could recover when her decision to have an abortion is based in part on
.'objectively incorrect information on fetal development given to her by the
,provider. Martinez, like Ferrara, is essentially a malpractice case and not a
traditional informed consent action in which significant risks and alterna-
tives are not adequately disclosed to the patient.167
In 1989, with Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,168 a plurality of the
Court, not including Justice Blackmun, changed the Court's position that
abortion was a fundamental right, holding that the right was a liberty inter-
est protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 169 Although
not dealing with informed consent, the Court's opinion was relevant to
that topic. At issue was the constitutionality of a Missouri statute' 70 which
required a physician to perform a test to determine the viability of the fetus
before undertaking an abortion.17' The statute required this determina-
tion to be made irrespective of the trimester of pregnancy. If the fetus was
viable, the statute prohibited abortion, unless the woman's life or health
was in danger.172 The Court ruled that the statute was constitutional under
the liberty interest test in that it furthered the state's interest in "protecting
potential human life throughout pregnancy." 73 Citing the Thornburgh dis-
sents, the Court based its opinion on the right of the state, within the con-
text of abortion rights, to protect the fetus throughout the pregnancy, both
before and after viability, and abandoned the Roe v. Wade trimester analysis
as being too rigid.174
The language of the opinions revealed a blunt and harsh debate with
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, charging that
the change in standards had eroded protections of women's abortion
rights.'7 5 He foresaw even more restrictive state regulation of abortion and
accused the plurality of deception in stating that Roe v. Wade was valid
therefore normally require that the abortion provider make the most careful, understandable
warnings on emotional or psychological harm to a patient considering abortion in order to pro-
tect the provider from the claim in a legal action that a release stating or referencing those
warnings is defective. See supra note 66. For a discussion of the impact of patient waivers of
warnings, see infra text accompanying notes 207-08.
166 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987). In Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp., 459 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1983), the
court held that a child had a valid cause of action against a physician for injuries sustained when
the physician failed to obtain the mother's consent before trying to abort. Unfortunately, the
record in this case presents virtually nothing on the type of injury or why the consent was invalid.
167 A case can be made, however, that the Court's emphasis on the plaintiff's religious pro-
pensity in deciding that she was entitled to damages created an informed consent case and that
the damages issues format is subterfuge. Another case can be made that the holding is simply the
product of a Court nibbling at the edge of controversy.
168 492 U.S. 490, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
169 Id. at 520, 109 S. Ct. at 3058.
170 Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 1205.1(1)-(2), 1205.2, 188.029, 188.205, 188.210, 188.215 (1986).
171 Webster, 492 U.S. at 51-921, 109 S. Ct. at 3054-58.
172 Id. at 513, 109 S. Ct. at 3054 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.029 regarding viability testing);
id. at 519, 109 S. Ct. at 3057 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.030 regarding the prohibition of
abortions after viability unless required for the woman's life or health).
173 Id. at 519, 109 S. Ct. at 3057. The ChiefJustice was joined in this section (II-D) only by
Justices White and Kennedy. Justices Scalia and O'Connor each concurred separately.
174 Id. at 518-19, 109 S. Ct. at 3056-57.
175 Id. at 537-60, 109 S. Ct. at 3067-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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when, he claimed, it had been abandoned.176 The dissent stated that
under Roe v. Wade's trimester analysis, viability testing affecting second tri-
mester abortions was impermissible and argued that the trimester system
was essential to Roe v. Wade protections.
77
Justice O'Connor, concurring, argued that in Thornburgh all members
of the Court had agreed that states could protect potential life where viabil-
ity is possible, and that the plurality opinion was therefore consistent with
the fundamental guarantee of abortion in Roe v. Wade.'78 She renewed her
Akron-Thornbourgh criticisms of the trimester system but nonetheless de-
clined to review Roe v. Wade.' 79 This position was methodically attacked by
Justice Scalia, concurring, who observed thatJustice Blackmun was correct
in his conclusion that Roe v. Wade had been overruled.'8 0 He argued that
either Roe v. Wade must serve as the foundation for abortion case analysis,
or that another standard must. By ruling too narrowly on the constitution-
ality of the Missouri statute, Justice Scalia stated, the Court had failed to
provide an adequate standard to apply in future decisions.' 8 ' Justice
O'Connor's opinions, however, beginning with her articulation of the un-
due burden test in Akron and her criticism of the trimester system, show
that her primary goal was to achieve a "balanced" approach (explicitly
stated in Thornburgh) in which the patient participated in an informed
manner with the physician throughout to choose between abortion or
childbirth. 8 2 In this process, as stated in Webster, a state's interest in pro-
tecting potential life would be substantially heightened at viability.'8 3 The
balanced approach would also, of course, represent a consensus or balance
of the divergent views on the Court.
In 1992, an intricately constructed plurality in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey'8 4 established Justice O'Connor's view of
the law as the law, ruling that a Pennsylvania informed consent statute was
constitutional.' 8 5 The statute required that the physician inform a woman
seeking an abortion at least twenty-four hours in advance of the procedure
about the health risks of abortion and childbirth.' 86 It further required the
physician to inform the patient of the "probable gestational age of the un-
176 Id. at 538-39, 109 S. Ct. at 3067.
177 Id. at 541-46, 109 S. Ct. at 3069-72.
178 Id. at 522-31, 109 S. Ct. at 3059-64 (O'Connor,J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
179 Id. at 525-27, 109 S. Ct. at 3060-61.
180 Id. at 532-37, 109 S. Ct. at 3064-67 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
181 Id. at 532-33, 109 S. CL at 3064.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 139-41 and 159-61.
183 Webster, 492 U.S. at 531, 109 S. Ct. at 3063-64 (O'ConnorJ, concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment). At the heart of the Webster revolt againstJustice Blackmun's position
was his over-reaching (within the pale of abortion rights) in Thomburgh. His opinion went be-
yond an analysis of the statute in question to accomplish a form of pre-emption, as it were, of
informed consent law, barring informed consent in abortion. See supra text accompanying notes
142-50.
184 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion). The plurality, of course, was
formed by Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy.
185 Id. at 881-87, 112 S. Ct. at 2822-26.
186 Id. at 881, 112 S. Ct. at 2822. The statute, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3214 (1990), is
reprinted in an appendix to the opinion. Webster, 505 U.S. at 902-11, 112 S. Ct. at 2833-38.
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born child."' 8 7 The physician or another qualified person had to inform
the woman of the availability of materials published by the state. The
materials described the fetus, provided information concerning medical
assistance for childbirth, and listed resources that would be available if the
woman chose to give birth to the child.'88 In order to obtain an abortion,
the patient had to state in writing that she knew of these materials and that,
if she wanted to view them, that they had been presented to her.18 9 The
Court stated:
In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences
of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the
risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with dev-
astating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully in-
formed. If the information the State requires to be made available to the
woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be
permissible. 190
Casey thus ended the concept in the Court's jurisprudence that abortion
was a minor procedure and, if any doubt lingered after Webster, repealed
the trimester approach as flawed.' 9' In reaching its decision, the Court did
187 Webster, 505 U.S. at 881, 112 S. Ct. at 2822 (plurality opinion).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 882, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
191 Id. at 872-73, 112 S. Ct. at 2817-18. The Court found the trimester system "flawed" because
it did not place enough value on the state's interest in "potential life," and because it did not
recognize that the pregnant woman's interest in good counseling existed during all stages of
pregnancy, not simply in the latter stage.
The importance of knowledgeable counseling may be illustrated by a hypothetical situation.
Suppose a healthy professional woman who puts in long stressful working hours had an abortion
after being counseled at a clinic about her fears that her demanding work hours might result in a
damaged baby. After her abortion, to which she was encouraged by clinic representatives, she
developed post-abortion trauma, which resulted in substantial economic loss. The clinic may be
liable to her if it did not inform her that studies show virtually no correlation between long hours
of stressful work and adverse pregnancy results in women of high status who were otherwise
healthy. See Mark A. Klebanoff et al., Outcomes of Pregnancy in a National Sample of Resident Physi-
cians, 323 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1040 (1990) (The applicability of the study to a particular situation,
of course, would require expert medical evidence.)
Much more common is the idea that abortion should prevent unwanted children. Even if a
patient identifies a child to be born as unwanted, studies have shown that about one-third of the
mothers who gave birth to and kept these children had similar feelings about the children in
interviews conducted a year later. See Nancy F. Russo, Psychological Aspects of Unwanted Pregnancy
and its Resolution, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAw 593-94 (J. Douglas Butler & David F.
Walbert eds., 4th ed. 1992) (citing studies). About the same portion of negative feelings about
the children were noted at interviews conducted two years later. Id.
Problems with unwantedness, however, were correlated to external factors such as poverty,
immaturity, educational disadvantage, and marital conflict. Id. at 595. These conditions, of
course, are subject to improvement with assistance from public and private sources. I draw from
this that the unwanted child is not so deemed because of the qualities of the child but because of
the external circumstances in which the patient finds herself. Careful pre-abortion counseling on
unwantedness would therefore explore areas of help in changing the unwanted external condi-
tions, and prevent the patient from sustaining the loss of her child and consequent post-abortion
psychological trauma.
Russo, it should be noted, devalues the concept of a post-abortion syndrome, id. at 617-19,
but does so in part because "women are at higher risk for depression than men" and "are more
likely to ruminate about things that bother them than to take instrumental action." Id. at 618.
If psychological reasons are employed as a basis for the decision to abort, then under one
study psychological or psychiatric treatment, not abortion, could well produce good results for
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not apply the Webster liberty interest test but used the undue burden test
based on the "liberty interest" in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause to determine whether state legislation limiting abortion rights
was constitutional.19 2 Following an elaborate defense of the Roe v. Wade
abortion right, the Court observed that a woman has a right in the expres-
sion of her liberty interest to choose to terminate or to continue her preg-
nancy. The state, however, may assert its interests in "fetal life" if they do
not become an "undue burden" on the liberty interest.193 A state, there-
fore, can take steps to insure that the woman's choice is "thoughtful and
informed."19 4 The Court wrote:
What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a
right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do
no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the
parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life
of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the
woman's exercise of the right to choose. 195
The physician did not have to comply with "the informed consent provi-
sions 'if he or she can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that he or she reasonably believed that furnishing the information would
have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental health
of the patient."' 9 6 On informed consent, the Court concluded: "Thus, a
requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part of ob-
taining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no differ-
ent from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information
about any medical procedure.' 97 Without question, the Court found no
undue burden on the abortion right which required further analysis under
a heightened scrutiny standard. The Court then expressly overruled the
informed consent provisions in Akron and Thomburgh.19 8
The Chief Justice and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas concurred
on the informed consent conclusions' 9 9 but argued that, although abor-
tion is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, the rational
relationship test and not the undue burden-heightened scrutiny test
the mother. Myre Sim & Robert Nessler, Post-Abortive Psychoses: A Report From Two Centers, in THE
PSYCHOLOGIcAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION (David Mall & Walter F. Watts eds., 1979). This study indi-
cates that continuing counseling throughout pregnancy should be offered the prospective abor-
tion patient needing psychological treatment to allow that patient to have her child.
192 Casey, 505 U.S. at 844-79, 112 S. Ct. at 2803-20.
193 Id. at 857-61, 112 S. Ct. at 2810-12. The undue burden analysis, it should be obvious, is
meant to occupy an area between the strict scrutiny and rational relationship tests. The test
allows the Court to find or tailor solutions to abortion rights disputes without twisting either the
rational relationship or strict scrutiny standards. Deeper understandings of undue burden are set
out in two recent articles: Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 867 (1994); Robin L. West, The Nature of the
Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on Professor Brownstein's Analysis of Casey, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 961
(1994).
194 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872, 112 S. Ct. at 2818.
195 1d. at 877, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
196 Id. at 883-84, 112 S. Ct. at 2824 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAr. § 3205 (1990)).
197 Id. at 884, 112 S. Ct. at 2824.
198 Id. at 883-85, 112 S. Ct. at 2824-25.




should be followed.200 Justice Blackmun, rejoicing in the perception that
the Court did not further restrict abortion lights, continued to advance the
strict scrutiny approach, 201 arguing that the Pennsylvania informed consent
provisions (which he thought slanted) were unconstitutional as not fur-
thering "maternal health." Justice Blackmun cited Thornburgh strictures
against imposing informed consent requirements on physicians as requir-
ing his conclusion.
20 2
Justice Stevens, seeing the abortion decision as a matter of conscience,
argued that the state may not "inject" information into the woman's deci-
sion, thus devaluing the role that states have in protecting women's
health.203 This was an articulation of the previous majority view which saw
this information as an impediment to political fights and not as fundamen-
tal or helpful to women's medical care. He stated that fetuses are not per-
sons, comparing their situation to that of Haitians at sea trying to become
"persons" under American law.2 0 4
The plurality's formulation of the law allowed patients' rights to be
considered throughout the process. Making objective information on fetal
development available, and allowing for waiting periods to consider that
information, were permissible, and even desirable, to help a patient decide
on a course of action. The patient's decision on whether to have the abor-
tion, and indeed on whether her fetus was human, was to be subjective and
unreviewable. In short, the Court placed women's rights as patients para-
mount to the interests of those who would protect women from accurate
information.205
IV. THE ACTION EMERGES
It is inescapable that one great consequence of Casey is that women
considering abortions undeniably now have the same rights constitution-
ally to informed consent on abortion risks and alternatives that patients
have for other procedures in their respective jurisdictions. These rights do
not depend on the implementation of a statute similar to Pennsylvania's.
The Court in Casey approved informed consent rights in abortion by elimi-
nating or limiting, as a matter of constitutional law, restrictions on those
rights established in Roe v. Wade and upheld through Thornburgh. The anal-
200 Id. at 966, 112 S. Ct. at 2867.
201 Id. at 922-23, 112 S. Ct. at 2844 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part, concurring in the judg-
ment in part, and dissenting in part). Comparing Webster with Casey, Justice Blackmun was ex-
cited to write, "But now, just when so many expected the darkness to fall, the flame has grown
bright." Id. at 922, 112 S. Ct. at 2844.
202 Id. at 929-32, 112 S. Ct. at 2847-49.
203 Id. at 914-18, 112 S. Ct. at 2839-41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204 Id. at 915 n.3, 112 S. Ct. at 2840 n.3. This illustration confuses citizenship and resident
alien status with personhood.
205 This protects not only women, but also tends toward protecting the interest of the fetus
which presumably is to live. The legal term "fetus" is, of course, a well known term which allows
the woman considering abortion-and indeed the society-to try to be emotionally distanced
from the act. The term has been used in this Article because this is the term courts have used. It
is, however, not commonly used even by government agencies advertising assistance or informa-
tion to improve pre-bom infant health. In those usages, the term "baby" is used. This indicates a
general cultural perception that'only those unborn babies are legally human or prehuman who
are declared so by their mothers. This dovetails with the Casey holding.
1996)
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ysis, applicable to statutory informed consent rights in Pennsylvania, like-
wise prevents contraction of informed consent rights arising under the
patient's or professional rules. Put differently, the Supreme Court's man-
dated substantive law restricting informed consent, set out from Roe v. Wade
through Thornburgh, is now non-existent and ajurisdiction's general law of
informed consent applies in the absence of a specific statute on abortion
rights.
Counseling is immediately affected. The purpose of first trimester
counseling in Roe v. Wade was so bluntly aimed at sensitively accomplishing
abortions that it was put beyond state review. With the abolition of the
trimester system and the approval of the integrated approach to treatment
throughout pregnancy, counseling at any stage now must be conducted by
giving reasonably full information on all factors medically relevant to the
patient's decision to avoid the charge under informed consent law that ma-
terial information was kept from the patient.
Casey itself obviously proceeded under a view of patient rights consis-
tent with the patient's rule. It would be incorrect, however, to argue that
Casey requires that all patient abortion decisions be determined under that
standard. Nothing in Casey requires that conclusion. In jurisdictions em-
ploying the professional rule, or some hybrid of the two rules, an abortion
patient's rights to information will be determined under the laws of that
jurisdiction applicable to all procedures. Distinctions between the two ap-
proaches, while critical to the formulation of a court action for damages
caused by a violation of informed consent rights, will be insignificant in
determining standards of medical practice. As will be recalled from Natan-
son, the professional rule requires that the patient be given enough infor-
mation to make an informed consent. This implies that a physician's
withholding of important information on the risks of potential harmful psy-
chological and emotional consequences arising from an abortion, absent
significantjustifying factors, will be viewed in professional rule jurisdictions
as usurping the patient's right to informed consent. Therefore, we may
expect a generally uniform response in both patient and professional rule
jurisdictions to the problems of how and to what extent the patient should
be informed of potential emotional and psychological problems.
This requires, of course, barring an immediate peril requiring surgery,
that time be taken to determine these risks for each patient and to allow
her to evaluate them. A significant waiting period, therefore, is now neces-
sary between the time a woman enters an abortion clinic and the time the
abortion is performed so that the abortion provider can obtain a valid his-
tory of her health, develop her psychological profile, and interview her to
assess the risks of serious psychological harm. The provider should then
fully discuss the risks and applicable alternatives as they apply to the patient
and ascertain her informed intent before proceeding with the abortion, if
that is her decision. Given the high proportion of psychological injuries
from abortions, foreseeable psychological injury normally would be
thought to be present in treating a patient considering abortion, until it is
ruled out in competent preprocedure screening. If in this process the pa-
tient demonstrates an increased likelihood of developing an adverse psy-
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chological consequence from an abortion, then she should be carefully
advised of the heightened risks to her psychological health before she de-
cides on the procedure.
20 6
A provider may rely on a referring physician or service to acquire rele-
vant information and to do psychological testing and counseling for the
prospective abortion patient. All providers and referring entities will need
to make sure who in the chain of referral has the primary responsibility to
inform the patient of the risks and alternatives relevant to the decision.
Care will have to be taken by the provider that the referrer properly in-
forms the woman if the referrer is to do this. Similarly, a referrer of abor-
tion patients may have liability to the patient if it undertakes counseling
and does not adequately explore risks and alternatives with the patient, or
if it refers a patient to an abortion provider when it knows or should know
that the provider does not properly inform patients of relevant risks or
allow time for proper evaluation.
Abortion providers will likely assert that abortion patients can waive
the warnings.207 A waiver of the warning itself normally will serve, however,
as a warning to the provider to explore why the receipt of information is
sought to be waived. This predictably will necessitate even more careful
study of that patient to make sure that the grounds for the waiver are rea-
sonable since the physician and not the patient has the duty to make sure
that the patient understands the procedure. This careful approach could,
for example, be very helpful in determining whether the patient was being
pressured to have an abortion.
208
None of this involves specific state action and inevitably it will be asked
whether a state may statutorily expand or contract a woman's informed
consent rights in abortion procedures. The answer, based on her right to
equal protection of the law, is that any limitation of a patient's right to
information in the abortion decision will be almost certainly struck down,
absent a compelling reason for that limitation, if she would be entitled to
this information when considering another type of procedure. Expansions
of her right also may be viewed with skepticism by courts, if those expan-
sions are tailored to argue with her choice and not to inform the patient.
Regulations based on validly informing the patient of risks, alternatives and
relevant informed choice factors, however, absent a reactionary movement
on the Court to limit women's rights, will be found constitutional. Here
undue burden analysis would have to be carefully followed.
20 9
206 If abortions come to be done by medication rather than surgery, and a clinic, as we under-
stand it, is bypassed, the practitioner will no doubt have to determine risks which predictably will
require referrals to those with expertise in determining psychological risk. In parental bypass
decisions (not a subject of this Artcle), courts may wish to have informed consent counseling
conducted by third parties without tort immunity in order to preserve any action a pregnant
minor may acquire for improper informed consent advice. To avoid later questions, preservation
of the minor's rights should be done by specific order.
207 See supra text accompanying note 58.
208 See supra note 23.
209 If ajurisdiction has pre-Casey statutes establishing abortion informed consent rights which
are lesser in scope than those rights formulated under Casey, these provisions should be inter-
preted as conveying rights recognized in Casey or should be amended to explicitly provide those
rights. Otherwise, pregnant women may raise equal protection challenges, claiming the provi-
sions improperly restrict their rights to knowledge that would enable them to make an informed
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In civil actions, defendants will have the same defenses as in other in-
formed consent cases. We may expect, however, that in some jurisdictions
attempts will be made to exclude all recovery for psychological damages on
the grounds that there is neither an accompanying physical impact nor
resulting physical injury. Courts, however, probably will allow recovery
where damages were foreseeable and there is objective proof of emotional
injury caused by informed consent violation since recovery would not be
based on speculation or fraud. Recovery probably will be allowed, how-
ever, only where the psychological impact on the woman is substantial.
Compensation based exclusively on short-term sense of loss, repression, or
guilt very predictably will be disallowed. Given the ability of American
courts to respond to social problems (as illustrated by the development of
privacy and products liability law), however, it will be improvident to as-
sume that the rules requiring physical injury or impact to accompany emo-
tional injury will serve as a barrier to the redress of objectively provable
damages in what is surely a national tragedy in women's health.
Abortion informed consent cases, due to the diversity of views on abor-
tion, however, may tell us more about the triers of fact than about justice.
Even so, courts should be able to develop a sufficient portrait of the plain-
tiff to submit the question of the adequacy of informed consent for objec-
tive determination. The ultimate factual question will be whether a
reasonable person in the plaintiffs situation, with full right to have an
abortion, would have undertaken it had she been informed properly of the
probability of psychological harm to her. Here the factors on which the
decision was based, which may be seen as subjective, would be relevant on
what a reasonable person with these views would have done.
Information on fetal development will be included in counseling as
part of providing reasonably full information to the patient because attach-
decision. Similarly, if a state agency or employee refers patients for abortion and does not insist
that full information on risks and alternatives be made av'.lable to the patient, numerous viola-
tions may be present. These include illegal state action to deprive her of due process and equal
protection of the law. Consider also the applicability of § 1983 actions for local governmental
activity depriving the patient of relevant information. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 914-18, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2839-41(1992) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the need to avoid state regulation of reproductive
choice).
Sometimes it is difficult to see state control or exploitative action in practices which are
generally accepted or acquiesced to by society. A perspective on the exploitation of women in
abortion can be discovered by analogy in Karen A. German, Note, Sexual Control in the Slaveholding
South: The Implementation and Maintenance of a Racial Caste System, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 115
(1984).
A quick way to grasp the practical impact of Casey on abortion practice is to compare choices
accorded women in the Model Women's Informed Choices Act, Renfer et al., supra note 27, with
the rights of women set out later in Casey. The reader will find that the Model Act, presumably
written with the idea of expanding protection, is actually less protective of the right to an in-
formed decision.
Consider also legislation outlawing the collection of money for a surgical or pharmaceutical
procedure until relevant psychological-social evaluations of the patient are completed (or cor-
rectiy waived) and explained to the patient, unless serious medical factors require the procedure
to be completed earlier. The proposed statute would allow the woman to consider the abortion




ment to the fetus has been a substantial factor in post-abortion trauma.21 0
If after the abortion a woman comes to believe that her fetus was in fact
human, then logically an internal conflict has been created in which she
suffers trauma, having come to believe that she has killed or allowed the
killing of her child. Studies have focused on risk factors such as pressure,
self-esteem, and maturity of character in determining the likelihood of
post-abortion psychological trauma.21' While these are surely significant, it
is moral realization, by definition, that is at the heart of the traumatic reac-
tion. Accordingly, basic and understandable facts concerning fetal devel-
opment, genetic structure, infant qualities, and alternatives to abortion
should be fully presented to the patient so that she will not have a cruel
surprise after the abortion.21 2 Given the risks of subsequent emotional in-
jury, correctly offering this information would limit attacks that the consent
given to the abortion was uninformed and therefore invalid. While offer-
ing this information may not be required in unusual cases, providing it and
lucidly explaining it (unless it is validly declined) has a further advantage
in that women will be treated as persons competent to handle difficult ethi-
cal problems. No doubt dissentient voices will claim this information in-
spires the trauma and requires providers to disclose a new parade of
horribles. They will seek accordingly to have the courts restrict the scope
of information which must be offered.21 3 This is an argument for the sec-
ond-class status of women, indeed, for their fragility, and is irresponsible in
the face of the vast destruction caused by post-abortion psychological
trauma. Tailored but reasonably complete advice on risks may, of course,
lead to fewer abortions, but those abortions will be the product of factually
informed choice.214 Statistical decline in post-abortion trauma incidence
210 See SPECKHARD, supra note 24. Casey stated that the Pennsylvania approach allowed coun-
seling to proceed with "profound respect for the life of the unborn." Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2821 (1992) (plurality
opinion). This counseling process will be thought not to apply in any jurisdiction unless the
informed consent law of the jurisdiction allows it. If counseling nonetheless proceeded on a
contrary theory, without respect for the life of the unborn, could this have actionable conse-
quences? Consider whether the absence of "respect" in counseling could foreseeably cause psy-
chological trauma. Could counseling which treated the unborn child as crude and disposable
tissue be itself actionable if the damages are caused later, when the reality of fetal qualities be-
come known to the post-abortion patient? If so, consider actions for injurious statements in
health care resulting in damages. See Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634 (Iowa 1990); see also
Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Ariz. 1975) (holding that if a patient gives consent
under factual mistakes on inherent risks of the proposed procedure, the consent is still valid in
the absence of fraud). Would consistent and marked failure to give scientifically accurate infor-
mation on unborn life and its development then give rise to actionable fraud?
211 See supra text accompanying notes 13-23.
212 See SPECKHARD, supra note 24 (discussing attachment to the fetus).
213 A study by Alfini indicated that patients appreciated 'straightforward and perhaps even
harsh" information about risks of angiography, and that this did not create greater fear in them.
RalphJ. Alfini, Informed Consent: A Study of Patient Reaction, 216 JAMA 1325 (1971). Alfini also
discusses the informed consent forms used in the study. These forms contain explicit but suc-
cinct information about risks of serious injury or death and discuss the frequency of certain risks,
with some risks being described as "rare" and "more rarely." Also, the forms provide the ratios of
cases with serious complications to all cases in the relevant group. Id. at 1329. This is the type of
data from which Supreme Court members, based on virtually nondiscussable personal beliefs,
sought to protect women considering abortions.
214 Wood & Durham, supra note 27, at 792, also address the constitutional abortion rationale.
They argue that the constitutional right of privacy is not based on subjectivity but rather on
rational choice. Id. That a rational choice approach forms the basis for the subsequent undue
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may not occur, but if it does, a substantial victory in women's health will
result. Even if the incidence of post-abortion trauma does not decline, at
least women sustaining injury will have been carefully offered information
on emotional-psychological consequences of abortion prior to the abortion
relevant to each particular situation. These women will generally be un-
able to attribute in court the lack of informed perception of risks as the
cause of their injuries. In any event, the former decrepit abortion consent
rationale, based on a tolerance, if not an encouragement, of patient igno-
rance is ended.
burden-liberty interest analysis in Casey, however, cannot be maintained. The term informed
choice thus must be left as permitting a subjective decision by the patient; objective rationality,
expressed in the duty to offer to fully inform the patient with correct information, is imposed on
the provider.
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